Yutaro AKITA
Bio
Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Penn State
ytrakita (at) gmail (dot) com
Fields: Decision theory ยท Microeconomic theory
Working papers
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w/ Kensei Nakamura | September 2025
We provide a model of preferences over lotteries of acts in which a decision maker behaves as if optimally filtering her ambiguity perception. She has a set of plausible ambiguity perceptions and a cost function over them, and chooses multiple priors to maximize the minimum expected utility minus the cost. We characterize the model by axioms on attitude toward randomization and its timing, uniquely identify the filtering cost from observable data, and conduct several comparatives. Our model can explain Machina's (2009) two paradoxes, which are incompatible with many standard ambiguity models.
@unpublished{AkitaNakamura2025, author = {Akita, Yutaro and Nakamura, Kensei}, doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2509.05076}, note = {arXiv:2509.05076}, title = {Randomization and Ambiguity Perception}, year = {2025}, } -
January 2025
This paper presents a simple proof of Dekel's (1986) representation theorem for betweenness preferences. The proof is based on the separation theorem.
@unpublished{Akita2025, author = {Akita, Yutaro}, doi = {10.48550/arxiv.2405.11371}, note = {arXiv:2405.11371}, title = {A Simple Proof of the Representation Theorem for Betweenness Preferences}, year = {2025}, }
Work in progress
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This paper examines the behavioral implications of costly information acquisition on information acquisition problems. The primitive of my model is a preference relation over pairs of a decision rule and an experiment, which I call strategies. I develop axiomatic foundations for a model of costly information acquisition by a Bayesian decision maker. She chooses strategies as if balancing the benefit and cost of information. I also characterize the special cases of the costly information acquisition model where (i) the payoff and the cost are additively separable; (ii) the payoff and the cost are additively separable and the cost is posterior separable.
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I axiomatically characterize a class of preferences over Blackwell experiments that have Bayesian representations. In the representation, the decision maker behaves as if maximizing the value of information for some decision problem and prior. My key axiom, concatenation independence, reflects Bayesian decision makers' independence of mixing experiments as long as likelihood ratios are preserved. I establish the essential uniqueness of the decision problem for a given prior. I also show that choices over a simple class of experiments are enough to elicit the decision problem.